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I.

INTRODUCTION

“No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He
sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions
1
and ways of thinking.”
We view the world amidst the mores of our social group; in the
context of closely-held traditions; with the bent of our own bias;
and through the shadows of our prejudices. These cultural
constructs and social ideologies color our perceptions and shape
the lens with which we see the world. The legal system, carried
forth by human actors, is not immune to these pervasive powers.
Particularly subject to these value-based judgments are child
welfare proceedings with substantive and procedural components
†
1.

J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2009.
RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 2 (1934).
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that are inherently discretionary, often evaluated in light of the
factual circumstances and needs of the child.
2
In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B. examines the jurisdictional
3
undercurrent in state placement proceedings for an Indian child,
and it serves as a recent example of the consequences produced
when such beliefs become inappropriately woven into judicial
institutions.
For years, state law infused Indian child welfare proceedings
4
middle-class
standards,
with
white,
resulting
in
a
disproportionately high number of children removed from their
5
6
homes. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) sought, by means
of the tribal courts, to curb the devastating impact state biases had
7
on native tribes. Recognizing the irreplaceable resource children
8
are to a tribe’s vitality, ICWA gave jurisdictional preference to
9
tribal courts. These venues have a special understanding of the
nuances of Indian culture often misunderstood by social-service
10
agencies, and their position within the tribal community provide
valuable insight into the devastating effects removal has on the
11
tribe itself.

2. 724 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2006).
3. This case note uses the term “Indian” to maintain continuity with the
statutory language in its discussion of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and to keep
with the vernacular used by scholarship in this area.
4. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7546) (federal legislation is needed to ensure that “Indian child welfare
determinations are not based on ‘a white, middle-class standard which, in many
cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family.’”).
5. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32 (“Studies undertaken by the Association on
American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974 . . . showed that 25 to 35% of all Indian
children had been separated from their families and placed in adoptive families,
foster care, or institutions.”). See also Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1901(4) (2000) [hereinafter ICWA] (discussing the “alarmingly high” instances of
removal and non-Indian placement); MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES., 2007
TRIBAL/STATE AGREEMENT 1 (Feb. 22, 2007), http://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/
lfserver/Legacy/DHS-5022-ENG [hereinafter MN Tribal Agreement] (“Prior to
1978, Indian children were being placed in foster care at a nationwide rate ten to
twenty times that for non-Indian children.”).
6. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2000).
7. Id. § 1911.
8. Id. § 1901(3). (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .”).
9. Id. § 1911(a).
10. See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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Gaps in the Act’s language, however, led many courts to resort
12
to state law for guidance. In the absence of a statutory definition,
the courts borrowed and applied state-law concepts to construe
13
individual terms of the federal statute. Yet, such borrowing seems
fundamentally incongruous with the history and legislative intent
surrounding ICWA’s enactment—namely, avoidance of the
documented bias inherent in state law.
Today, the extent to which state law can influence and
supplement provisions of ICWA remains unresolved. In the recent
decision of In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that state rules may color ICWA’s “good cause”
exception in considering the timeliness of a request to remove an
14
Indian child welfare proceeding to tribal court. This deference to
state law for an important procedural component warrants
thoughtful and cautionary reflection on the devastating
circumstances that gave rise to the need for federal legislation; the
Act’s emphatically remedial nature; and the consequences a return
to state law may bring.
This note first summarizes the history behind ICWA and the
role of state courts in facilitating the cultural crisis leading to its
15
16
enactment. It then reports on the holding of T.T.B., followed by
17
an analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s methodology.
Finally, the note proposes a solution to the arguably precarious
expansion of state law in Indian child welfare proceedings that
18
decisions like T.T.B. potentially herald.
Through a de novo
standard of review, coupled with a lens of interpretive narrowness,
courts can best safeguard against future discord between state law
and native tribes in Indian child welfare proceedings by reducing
19
the opportunities available for majoritarian influence.

12. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (holding
that “well-settled” state law can aid in interpreting an undefined term).
13. See infra Part II.B discussing the Holyfield case and construction of the
term “domicile.”
14. Id. at 307–08.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Parts IV–VI.
19. See infra Parts IV–VI.
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II. HISTORY
The current disconnect concerning the welfare of Indian
20
children carries forward dark echoes of a tumultuous past:
From the earliest contact with Europeans, the security of
Indian families has been constantly tested . . . . Just as
their connection to the land was seen as an impediment
to assimilation, which had to be broken through the
reservation and allotment policies, the close bonds of
extended Indian families were also deemed obstacles
which had to be removed. . . . [T]he integrity of Indian
families was attacked by social, cultural, and economic
21
forces which were intended to break the familial bonds.
The near annihilation of native tribes and cultures through
government policies designed to force assimilation with the EuroAmerican majority bore down not only on the more tactile matters
22
of land, but also on the intangible essence of Indian families.
Most shocking, however, is the number of Indian children
removed from their homes pursuant to state child welfare policies
23
lacking cultural sensitivity to alternative forms of child-rearing.
20. See generally Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare
in the United States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17 (1996).
21. Id. at 22 (recounting the history of federal interference with Indian family
structures).
22. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 602–03 (1994)
(“According to the analysis of a Bureau of Indian Affairs social worker, the family
welfare branch of the Euro-American legal system might have depleted tribal
populations because of ‘profound prejudice and discrimination’ as part of a
deliberate campaign ‘to undermine Indian mores and values,’ just as EuroAmerica’s imperialist agenda had undermined Native America’s geographical
integrity.”).
23. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 603–04
(2002) (“Testimony before Congress preceding the enactment of the ICWA
indicated that state child welfare officials were insensitive to traditional Indian
approaches to child rearing, in particular the widespread practice of involving
members of a child’s extended family in significant care giving. Applying
majoritarian middle-class values, state workers often construed such practices as
neglect or even abandonment.”). See also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1989). In 1978, Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians testified before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and
Public Lands. Id. at 32–34. He observed that
[o]ne of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian
children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by
nontribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently
evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life
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In the late 1960s and 1970s, between twenty-five and
thirty-five percent of all Indian children nationwide were
separated from their families and living in an adoptive
family, foster care, or an institution. Approximately
eighty-five percent of these Indian children were placed
with non-Indian families. Two studies concluded that
Indian children were placed in foster care five times more
24
often than non-Indian children.
Statistics lay bare Minnesota’s own contribution to the crisis,
finding “one in eight Indian children under the age of 18 was in an
adoptive home, and during the year 1971–1972 nearly one in four
25
infants under one year of age was placed for adoption.”
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act
26

In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act,
responding to the unnervingly high number of Indian children
removed from their families by non-tribal social service agencies
27
and placed in non-Indian homes and institutions.
By its
enactment, Congress “attempted to educate the Anglo-American
judicial system on issues of Indian culture when dealing with Indian
28
child custody matters.”

and childrearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our
children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst
contemptful [sic] of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually
to a non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian
child.
Id. at 34–35 (citation omitted). High instances of poverty and alcoholism were
also frequently used to justify removal. Atwood, supra, at 604. Cf. MN Tribal
Agreement, supra note 5, at 4 (“recogniz[ing] that the necessary understanding of
an individual tribe’s history, religion, values, mores, and child-rearing practices is
best obtained from each tribe”).
24. Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child
Welfare Act and Its Continued Implementation in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
811, 818 (2000) (citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 15 (1974);
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531). See
also supra note 5.
25. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32.
26. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2000).
27. Id. § 1901(4). See also Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32; Carriere, supra note 22, at
600 (“Congress recognized that state social welfare systems, influenced by the
cultural bias that informed assimilationist policies, removed Native American
children from their families and tribes in extraordinary numbers.”).
28. Wahl, supra note 24, at 820.
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ICWA recognized Congress’ role in preserving native tribes
and the parasitic effect state removal proceedings had on the
29
tribes’ sustainability.
As a result, individual tribes received a
substantial interest in child welfare proceedings, nearly akin to the
30
child’s parents, under the Act.
Yet, ICWA conferred more power on the tribe than simply that
of a weighted intervening party. The Act articulated a federal
preference for Indian child welfare proceedings to be handled
31
through the child’s tribal court. “It is precisely in recognition of
this relationship [between the tribe and its children] . . . that ICWA
designates the tribal court . . . for the determination of custody and
adoption matters for reservation-domiciled Indian children, and
32
the preferred forum for nondomiciliary Indian children.”
Furthermore, ICWA also tacitly acknowledged the corrosive effect
33
continuous state interference had on tribal sovereignty.
In essence, ICWA’s power resonates from procedural
mechanisms favoring tribe involvement in order to prevent further
34
disruption of Indian families.
Two aspects of the Act are
particularly powerful: (1) notice to the tribe of the proceeding
coupled with rights of intervention, and (2) a presumption of tribal
35
As one commentator noted, ICWA “recognize[s]
jurisdiction.
that tribes have a serious stake in the welfare of their children and
empower[s] those tribes with expansive jurisdiction over Indian

29. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(2), (5) (“Congress . . . has assumed responsibility
for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes . . . [and] that the States . . .
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”).
30. See In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986) (“[T]he
tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on parity with the
interest of the parents.”).
31. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2000).
32. Halloway, 732 P.2d. at 969–70. Cf. MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at
3 (“The foundation of this Agreement is the acknowledgement that Indian people
understand that their children are the future of their tribes and vital to their very
existence. An Indian child is sacred and close to the creator.”).
33. See Halloway, 732 P.2d. at 966 (“The importance of tribal primacy in
matters of child custody and adoption cannot be minimized, for the ICWA is
grounded on the premise that tribal self-government is to be fostered and that few
matters are of more central interest to a tribe seeking to preserve its identity and
traditions than the determination of who will have the care and custody of its
children.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7541)).
34. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36–37 (1989).
35. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–12.
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child custody proceedings in order to prevent further
36
discrimination and destruction of tribal and family interests.”
Determining proper jurisdiction under the Act was more
ambiguous, however, when the child was not closely connected to
37
the tribe’s reservation. Known as “transfer jurisdiction,” a state
proceeding involving a child not residing within or domiciled on
the reservation could be transferred to the tribal court upon
38
request, absent good cause to the contrary. ICWA, however, failed to
39
define “good cause.”
In 1979, roughly a year after ICWA’s enactment, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) addressed the issue of “good cause” and
provided additional interpretive commentary by publishing a set of
40
guidelines (the Guidelines) to assist state courts.
While not
41
The
binding, they “offer some structure to state courts.”
Guidelines identify four factors for determining whether “good
cause” exists to deny a jurisdictional transfer, including that “the
proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer
was received and the petitioner did not file the petition promptly
42
after receiving notice of the hearing.”
Significantly, the
Guidelines noted that “good cause” was intended “to provide state
43
courts with flexibility . . . .”

36. Kunesh, supra note 20, at 18 (summarizing the principles behind ICWA’s
enactment).
37. ICWA § 1911(b).
38. Id. Jurisdiction is transferable provided neither parent objects and the
tribal court consents to jurisdiction. Id.
39. Id. See also In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 1994)
(noting that nothing in the language of ICWA itself or its legislative history defines
“good cause”).
40. BIA Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44
Fed. Reg. 67,584–95 (Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter The Guidelines].
41. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 361. See also In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77,
81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (“While the BIA Guidelines are not binding on courts,
unless Congress specifically invests the bureau with the authority to implement
rules pursuant to the Act, Minnesota appellate courts have consistently utilized the
Guidelines to answer as a matter of law questions unanswered by the language of
the ICWA itself.”) (citations omitted).
42. The Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,591. The Guidelines also cite
objection by the subject child if twelve years of age or older; undue hardship in
presenting evidence; and the unavailability of the child’s parents paired with little
or no contact with the child’s tribe as “good cause” reasons to deny the transfer.
Id.
43. The Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,584.
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B. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
Over a decade after the Act’s passage, the U.S. Supreme Court
had the opportunity to weigh in on the provisions of ICWA. In the
44
seminal case of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the
Court confronted the extent to which state law could bridge the
Act’s definitional deficits. The Court affirmed tribal jurisdiction as
45
the paramount feature of ICWA and held that Mississippi law
could not be used to determine the key but undefined term of
46
“domicile.” The state law definition effectively supplanted tribal
court jurisdiction in favor of the state court, negating ICWA’s
47
express purpose.
The situation in Holyfield began when a member of the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, then living on the tribe’s
reservation, gave birth to twins 200 miles away from the reservation
48
property. Immediately after their birth, the mother consented to
49
their adoption. The Holyfields filed an adoption petition six days
50
later, and the infants’ adoption was finalized less than a month
51
after their birth.
When the tribe sought to set aside the adoption, the state trial
court overruled the motion, finding the tribe had “never obtained
52
This conclusion was
exclusive jurisdiction over the children.”
based on the mother’s extensive efforts to ensure that the children
were born far from the reservation and her arrangement for their
53
immediate adoption by the Holyfields. Furthermore, the court
also considered that the children had never “resided on or
54
physically been on the Choctaw Indian Reservation.”
The Supreme Court disagreed. The acts of one individual
55
should not be allowed to circumvent ICWA’s remedial purposes.
44. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
45. Id. at 36 (citing tribal jurisdiction as the mainstay of ICWA).
46. See id. at 45–47.
47. See id. at 51–53.
48. Id. at 37.
49. Id. at 37–38.
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. Of note, Mississippi law generally provides a six-month waiting period
before a final adoption decree is entered. Id. at 38 n.10. However, the
Chancellor, at his or her discretion, may waive this period and immediately enter
the decree, as occurred here. Id.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 49 (“Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be
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Moreover, state law could not be used to displace tribal court
56
Congress had spoken: tribal courts were the
jurisdiction.
preferred forum for custody proceedings involving Indian
57
children.
The Supreme Court recounted many of the statistics leading
up to ICWA’s enactment while simultaneously acknowledging the
great historical disjoint between state institutions and the needs of
58
Based on such commanding congressional
Indian children.
findings, the Court emphatically declined to use the state
59
construction, as it would undermine congressional intent by
allowing individual tribe members to defeat ICWA’s jurisdictional
60
provisions. State law should not control ICWA proceedings since
it was the caustic divide between the state courts and the tribes
61
which first necessitated federal legislation.
In addition, the Court was troubled by the lack of uniformity
that would result if each state considered ICWA in light of its own
62
The Court also worried about the potentially drastic
laws.
measures parties might use to ensure their preferred result,
63
essentially forum-shopping among the states.
Thus, in its very first ICWA case, the Supreme Court
resounded the inherent remedial purposes of the Act, refusing to
permit jurisdictional encroachment by state courts on account of
language ambiguities.

defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for Congress was
concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also
about the impact on the tribes themselves of large numbers of Indian children
adopted by non-Indians.”).
56. See id. at 45 (“[I]t is most improbable that Congress would have intended
to leave the scope of the statute’s key jurisdictional provision subject to definition
by state courts as a matter of state law.”).
57. See id. at 42 (“In enacting the ICWA Congress confirmed that, in child
custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on the reservation, tribal
jurisdiction was exclusive as to the States.”); see also id. at 36 (ICWA “creates
concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not
domiciled on the reservation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 44–45, 50 n.24.
59. Id. at 44 (“First, and most fundamentally, the purpose of the ICWA gives
no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for the definition
of a critical term; quite the contrary.”).
60. Id. at 52.
61. Id. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000); supra note 57.
62. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45.
63. Id. at 46 (“[D]ifferent rules apply[ing] from time to time to the same
child . . . cannot be what Congress had in mind.”).
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C. Considering Minnesota
Minnesota subsequently passed its own legislation reflecting
the principles and provisions of ICWA. In 1985, the Minnesota
64
Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA) was enacted. MIFPA
“emphasiz[ed] the State’s interest in supporting the preservation of
the tribal identity of an Indian child and recogniz[ed] tribes as the
appropriate entities to provide direction to the State as to the best
65
interests of tribal children.” The struggle continued, however, in
the juxtaposition between state law and the undefined terms of the
paramount federal statute.
66
The leading Minnesota case of In re Custody of S.E.G. further
examined this interplay in the context of adoptive placement. In
S.E.G., the struggle arose from ICWA’s permissive but ambiguous
67
“good cause” exception, and the extent to which state courts
could deviate from the Act’s placement preferences via state-law
68
principles.
S.E.G. involved three Indian children, two of whom were
69
Beginning in
deemed to have extraordinary emotional needs.
February 1988, two of the children were moved six times, and the
third child five times, before placement in a non-Indian foster
70
home in August 1991. Roughly five months later, the children
71
were placed in an Indian pre-adoptive home.
Poor planning,
72
however, resulted in the children’s return after just nine days.
In October, the children transferred to an Indian foster home,
73
but placement lasted less than two months.
Subsequently, the
children were placed in the care of a different Indian foster
74
home. The trial court heard testimony from numerous expert
and lay witnesses regarding the benefits and challenges of
continued placement in the Indian foster home versus the pending

64. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.751–835 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
65. MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 1.
66. 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994).
67. See id. (“At issue is whether the placement preferences provision of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), provides a ‘good cause’ exception . . . .”). Id. at
358.
68. See id. at 361–63.
69. Id. at 360.
70. Id. at 359.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 360.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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75

adoption petition of the former non-Indian foster family. The
court concluded that “the children’s ‘need for permanence’ was an
extraordinary emotional need and that no suitable [Indian] family
76
was available for placement . . . .”
The adoption petition was
77
granted in the best interests of the children.
Setting aside the petition, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found that the state’s “best interests of the child” standard for
determining placement tended to subvert the intent of ICWA. The
standard involved a subjective evaluation generally grounded in
78
“values of majority culture.”
Instead, the court utilized factors
listed in the Guidelines coupled with a de novo standard of review
79
as to whether the factors were properly weighed and considered.
Improperly weighed factors were deemed issues of law and
80
thus subject to the more stringent standard of de novo review.
Considering the testimony presented, the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded there was an insufficient basis to determine that
the children had extraordinary emotional needs that were not
81
satisfied in their current Indian foster home.
“Most of the
testimony . . . which tended to establish that the children had
extraordinary physical or emotional needs was not presented by
82
qualified expert witnesses.” Instead, the experts “tended to show
that the children were not ready to be adopted and needed to
stabilize before being placed in an adoptive home and that their
need for stability was being met in [the home of their Indian foster
83
parent].” Since the trial court did not have the strong expert
basis requisite for an “exceptional” non-Indian adoptive placement
84
under the Guidelines, the matter was reversed.
75. See id. at 365–66 (“Our decision today is not meant in any way as a
criticism of the trial court’s handling of the matter. By contrast, it was because of
that court’s careful decisions at trial, which lasted six days, and the court’s
thorough findings of fact and thoughtful memorandum that we were able to
review this case effectively.”).
76. Id. at 360–61.
77. See id. at 361, 364.
78. Id. at 363 (stating that “[t]he best interests of the child standard, by its
very nature, requires a subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors, many, if not
all of which are imbued with the values of majority culture”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 363. See also infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 364–65.
82. Id. at 365.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 364–66 (failing to find good cause to deviate from ICWA
preferences in adoptive placement).
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Together, MIFPA and S.E.G. demonstrate Minnesota’s own
struggle with the “good cause” exception and its conscientious
attempts to conduct Indian child welfare proceedings within the
spirit and letter of ICWA. Despite these efforts, cases like In re
Welfare of Child of T.T.B. show “good cause” remains a tenuous and
85
unresolved issue under Minnesota law.
D. The Dangers of “Good Cause”
86

Illustrated in part by Holyfield, S.E.G., and later by T.T.B., case
law is rife with evidence demonstrating the difficulties courts
encounter when attempting to apply ICWA’s undefined terms.
The concept of “good cause” concerning jurisdictional transfers is
87
particularly troublesome. “[S]tate courts continue to create their
own definitions for several key terms of the ICWA . . . [including]
88
‘good cause’ not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe . . . .” Within
89
the four factors set forth in the Guidelines, courts have imported
a variety of judicial devices to determine whether good cause exists
90
to deny the transfer, such as forum non conveniens and, less
91
commonly, a “best interests of the child” analysis.
85. See infra Parts III–IV.
86. See supra Parts II.B–II.C and infra Part III.
87. See Wahl, supra note 24, at 825 (“Good cause is an ambiguous, continually
litigated concept. The only apparent dispositive factor in opposition to transfer is
the absence of a transferee tribal court.”). But cf. Atwood, supra note 23, at 644
(“State courts are sharply divided as to the weight to be given the BIA’s guidelines,
but the disagreements reflect a more fundamental discord about the appropriate
role of state judges in making substantive dispositions in Indian child welfare
proceedings.”).
88. Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 420 (1998).
89. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
90. The doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that “an appropriate
forum—even though competent under the law—may divest itself of jurisdiction if,
for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action
should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been
properly brought in the first place.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (8th ed. 2004).
See Metteer, supra note 88, at 440–41 (discussing the possible hardships imposed if
matters are transferred to tribal court under the standard of forum non
conveniens). See also In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(“[L]iberal expansion of the forum non conveniens doctrine would preclude
transferring jurisdiction to tribal courts except in cases where the child resides on
or near a reservation. . . . [This] would be contrary to the Congressional findings
and goals incorporated into ICWA.”).
91. Metteer, supra note 88, at 442–44 (discussing use of the “best interests of
the child” standard in evaluating motions to transfer jurisdiction). This approach
is generally rejected as according too much deference to state courts, which
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Similarly, there is no bright-line test to gauge timeliness under
the Guidelines to determine whether the proceeding is at an
advanced stage and if the tribe acted promptly in requesting the
92
93
transfer. Evaluated on a case-by-case basis, requests to transfer
jurisdiction have been denied when filed five months after the tribe
94
received notice of the proceedings, but also granted in situations
where the request came more than a year after the tribe was
95
notified. Without clear standards, “good cause” faces repeated
attack as a legal loophole allowing state courts too much latitude in
express contradiction to the Act.
Critiquing the inclusion of “good cause” in the Act’s
jurisdictional provision, Jeanne Louise Carriere asserts that
“[section 1911(b)] subjects the value of tribal involvement to EuroAmerican appraisal through the proviso that the state court can
96
refuse to transfer a case for good cause unspecified in the statute.”
Carriere also sharply observes:
The legislative history identified, as a principal source of
the Native American child welfare crisis, the cultural onedirectly conflicts with the purposes of ICWA. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia,
906 S.W.2d 152, 170 (Tex. App. 1995). In Yavapai-Apache Tribe, the Texas
appellate court
reject[ed] the best interest standard because it is relevant to issues of
placement, not jurisdiction. The only issue in cases involving motions to
transfer is the determination of the proper tribunal to resolve the custody
issue. Thus, the question of whether a parent or guardian is abusive,
neglectful, or otherwise unfit is irrelevant at this point. For a court to use
this standard when deciding a purely jurisdictional matter, alters the
focus of the case, and the issue becomes not what judicial entity should
decide custody, but the standard by which the decision itself is made.
The utilization of the best interest standard and fact findings made on
that basis reflects the Anglo-American legal system's distrust of Indian
legal competence by its assuming that an Indian determination would be
detrimental to the child.
Id. (citations omitted). Accord Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1065 (“considerations
involving the best interests of the child are relevant not to determine jurisdiction but
to ascertain placement”) (emphasis added).
92. See supra text accompanying note 43.
93. In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 632 (N.D. 2003) (“Whether a motion for
transfer jurisdiction is timely is determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .”).
94. See Metteer, supra note 88, at 439–40. See also A.B., 663 N.W.2d at 632–33
(citing cases in which transfer petitions were considered untimely filed, ranging
from the morning of trial to after the matter had concluded).
95. See Metteer, supra note 88, at 440. See also infra Part V, discussing In re
Welfare of Children of R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), which upheld
a transfer to the tribal court when the request was filed two years after the tribe
received notice of the proceeding.
96. Carriere, supra note 22, at 599.
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sidedness of state child welfare systems, including state
courts, coupled with their power to judge Native
American families by Euro-American standards.
By
including the language of good cause in section 1911(b),
Congress in effect allowed entities that had gone on
record denying a Native American subjectivity to have
97
discretion on that issue.
Similarly, one scholar aptly describes the “good cause”
98
exception as a “statutory battleground for jurisdiction.” Another
calls for its removal in order to “take away any possibility that the
state courts will variously define [good cause] and make exceptions
to provisions regarding tribal jurisdiction and the placement of
99
Indian children which are the heart of ICWA.”
ICWA was specifically enacted to avoid use of state law in
Indian child welfare proceedings. The “good cause” statutory
ambiguity creates a large loophole for courts to easily insert the old
adages of state law. Such use threatens to subvert the remedial
purposes of the statute.
E. Summary
In brief, the Indian Child Welfare Act endeavored to reduce
the staggering number of Indian children removed from their
homes by state systems whose laws failed to properly account for
tribal customs and values. When confronted with the use of state
law to supplement ICWA’s definitional deficits, courts have
repeatedly found that such overlap often leads to the very statesubjective assessment and bias the Act sought to avoid. To date, the
“good cause” provision remains particularly vulnerable to
inconsistent application and state-subjective interpretation.
III. IN RE WELFARE OF CHILD OF T.T.B.
100

In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B.
chronicles the lengthy
placement proceedings of an Indian child. While a typical child
welfare proceeding already faces a complicated and delicate
97. Id. at 648. See also id. at 610 (“In leaving questions open for EuroAmerican courts to answer, Congress entrusted determinations of the substance
and value of Native American family culture to the state courts that it earlier had
found to be culturally inadequate to make these determinations.”).
98. Atwood, supra note 23, at 612.
99. Metteer, supra note 88, at 471.
100. 724 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2006).
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calculus of competing interests, the tenets of ICWA introduce an
additional set of variables in those cases involving Indian children.
Congress sought to remove much of this complexity from the realm
of state law and the historical bias of state courts by establishing a
jurisdictional preference: such matters ought to be transferred to
the appropriate tribal court. The continuing struggle lies, however,
in the distinct but often overlapping legal spheres these two forums
101
share. As demonstrated by T.T.B. and its progeny, the question
of jurisdiction lies far beyond bright-line rules and absolutes.
In essence, T.T.B. is a case about balancing: When does a midproceeding transfer from state court to tribal court do greater
harm through the inevitable procedural delay (and consequently
belated resolution for the child) than continuing to adjudicate the
matter in state court, risking the historical bias of state law?
102
Child X.T.B. was born in November 2003.
Although his
parents both resided in Minnesota, his birth took place in Rhode
103
Island. X.T.B.’s mother, T.T.B., is a member of the Oglala Sioux
104
Tribe.
His father, G.W., is a member of the Yankton Sioux
105
Tribe.
X.T.B. was taken into protective custody in Rhode Island
almost immediately based on active child welfare proceedings in
106
Hennepin County
Minnesota concerning his half-sibling, A.G.
later filed a separate action concerning X.T.B., requesting either
termination of T.T.B.’s and G.W.’s parental rights or permanent
107
placement with a more suitable guardian. The Minnesota district
101. See infra Part V.
102. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 301.
103. Id. The record indicates A.G.M., the former foster care provider of
X.T.B.’s mother, id. at 301 n.1, lived in Rhode Island, and X.T.B.’s parents had
gone to visit her a month prior to X.T.B.’s birth. Id. at 301. While X.T.B.’s
parents initially preferred their child be placed with A.G.M., Rhode Island found
A.G.M. to be unsuitable, “based in part on [A.G.M.’s] involvement with the
questionable circumstances that led to [T.T.B.] giving birth in Rhode Island
instead of Minnesota.” In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d 799, 803
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
104. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 302.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 301. In April 2003, child protection proceedings began concerning
A.G., X.T.B.’s half-sister, daughter of T.T.B. and M.G. Id.
107. Id. at 301–02. Hennepin County added X.T.B. to the matter involving
A.G. on November 21, 2003. Id. T.T.B. and M.G. later voluntarily terminated
their parental rights to A.G. and X.T.B. was dismissed from his half-sister’s case.
Id. at 302 n.3. On December 31, 2003, the county filed the present action solely
concerning X.T.B. Id. at 302. T.T.B. was a minor at the time of X.T.B.’s birth and
the record suggests she was diagnosed with depression and post-traumatic stress

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 1
7. BUCHER - ADC

1444

6/11/2008 6:20:42 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

court subsequently ordered that X.T.B. be placed in protective
custody, and he was brought to Minnesota in late December
108
2003.
Mother T.T.B., the Oglala Sioux tribe, and the Yankton
109
Sioux tribe were notified in early January 2004 of the separate
action, and X.T.B.’s mother and father appeared at an initial
110
hearing in mid-February.
111
Early proceedings came in fits and starts. A pre-trial hearing
was set for June 10, 2004, and the trial scheduled for July 22,
112
2004.
A subsequent family group conference failed to reach a
consensus concerning X.T.B.’s placement, and the district court
announced deadlines for the exchange of witness and exhibit lists,
113
A
submission of pre-trial motions, and the trial date itself.
scheduling conflict, however, prompted the court to extend the
deadline for witness and exhibit lists, as well as for pre-trial
114
115
motions, to July 22, 2004, and the ensuing trial was postponed.

syndrome. T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 802. X.T.B.’s father, G.W., allegedly had
chemical health issues. Id.
108. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 302. The same day Hennepin County filed an
amended petition to add X.T.B. to the existing matter involving his half-sister,
A.G., and the county also moved ex parte to place X.T.B. in protective custody. Id.
at 301–02. As a result, X.T.B. was placed with A.G. under the care of A.G.’s
paternal grandmother. Id. at 302.
109. Id. In matters involving foster care placement or termination of parental
rights, state courts are obligated to notify the child’s tribe(s) of the proceeding
and the right to intervene. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2000).
110. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 302. It is unclear whether father G.W. was served
with the petition concerning X.T.B. Id. He did, however, receive notice of the
proceeding based on his appearance at the initial hearing held on February 17,
2004. See id. Overall, X.T.B.’s placement proceedings were somewhat delayed
pending an interstate transfer from Rhode Island, X.T.B.’s birthplace. Id. at 302
n.3. Rhode Island deferred to Minnesota based on the open case involving
X.T.B.’s half-sister, A.G. Id. at 302–03.
111. The initial admit/deny hearing was held on February 17, 2004. Id. at 302.
Mother T.T.B. entered a denial and father G.W. received a continuance until April
20, 2004, as a result of newly appointed counsel. Id. At the hearing on April 20,
T.T.B. favored transfer of custody to her former informal foster care provider in
Rhode Island, whereas G.W. considered a potential care arrangement and
permanent placement of X.T.B. with his mother, B.W. Id. at 302. As of April 20,
G.W. had still not entered a formal denial. Id.
112. Id. at 302–03.
113. These dates were originally July 8, 15, and 22, 2004, respectively. Id. at
303.
114. Id.
115. Id. The district court indicated the new trial date would be set at a later
time upon agreement of the parties and that the “delay would likely be a matter of
‘several weeks.’” Id.
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Hennepin County filed an amended petition on July 16, 2004,
and on July 21, G.W. moved for dismissal, “claiming the court
lacked jurisdiction and disputing grounds for termination of his
117
parental rights.”
The following day, roughly six months after the proceedings
began, T.T.B. and G.W. moved to transfer the matter to a tribal
118
On August 12, the district court denied G.W.’s motion to
court.
119
120
but deferred ruling on the jurisdictional transfer,
dismiss,
thereby “allow[ing] the Yankton Sioux tribe additional time to file
121
a written acceptance of jurisdiction.”
It was not until September
24, 2004, that the Yankton Sioux tribe individually moved to
122
transfer jurisdiction,
despite previous motions by both the
Yankton and Oglala Sioux tribes to intervene and participate in the
123
proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the transfer
request, concluding the “hardship” of the 400-mile distance to the
tribal court and the advanced nature of the proceedings
124
The matter
constituted “good cause” under the Guidelines.
remained in state court, and legal custody of X.T.B. was ultimately
transferred to S.G., X.T.B.’s interim guardian and the paternal
125
grandmother of his half-sister.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals quickly laid aside the district
126
court’s “hardship” finding.
The participants had neither
116. Id. The petition added additional personal information concerning
G.W.; supplemented the procedural history dating back to the original petition in
December 2003; and provided additional grounds for the termination of T.T.B.
and G.W.’s parental rights. Id.
117. Id. G.W. also moved to transfer custody to A.G.M. in Rhode Island, now
agreeing with T.T.B. concerning placement of X.T.B. Id. Cf. supra note 112.
118. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 303. X.T.B.’s parents moved to transfer the matter
to the Yankton Sioux Tribal Court. Id. The joint motion came six days after the
county filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights. See id.
119. Id. The district court held the county’s petition was sufficient to establish
a prima facie case. In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2006).
120. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 303.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 304.
123. See id. at 303 n.4. The Oglala Sioux Tribe moved to intervene in February
2004, followed by the Yankton Sioux Tribe in late April 2004. Id. Both tribes were
consulted regarding X.T.B.’s initial placement in the home of his half-sister’s
paternal grandmother. Id. at 302. Each tribe was also invited to attend a family
group conference. Id. at 303 n.4.
124. T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 803. See also The Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584,
67,591 (Nov. 26, 1979).
125. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 304.
126. See T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 806.
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objected to the transfer because of the distance nor stated it would
127
“Without
hamper their ability to participate in the proceeding.
evidence of undue hardship, distance alone cannot defeat a
128
transfer of jurisdiction to a tribal court.”
The appellate court
found the transfer request was properly filed, coming six days after
the county filed an amended petition to transfer legal custody, and
129
was submitted by the pretrial motion deadline.
Because the
district court did not indicate that the request was untimely at the
pretrial hearing, and even allowed the tribe to submit whether it
would accept jurisdiction, the appellate court reasoned the
130
Therefore, good cause to deny
proceedings were not advanced.
the transfer did not exist because the tribe’s motion of September
131
24 indicated the tribal court would accept jurisdiction.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, evaluated the nature
of the proceedings under a different judicial timeline. The court
concluded that the county’s motion merely updated the present
132
These periodic updates are required in juvenile
proceeding.
placement proceedings and, in this matter, did not substantively
133
affect the case.
Since the transfer request was filed on the same
day that witness lists, exhibit lists, and other pretrial motions were
due, the supreme court determined the proceedings had reached
134
an advanced stage.
Additionally, the advanced nature of the
matter was further evident in the lapse of Minnesota’s six-month
deadline governing child placement proceedings for children less
135
than eight years old.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the district court
order denying the transfer, emphasizing the lengthy involvement of
136
both X.T.B.’s parents and the tribes prior to the transfer requests.
Further, while acknowledging the remedial intent of ICWA and the

127. Id.
128. Id. Cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text regarding use of the
standard of forum non conveniens.
129. T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 806.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn. 2006).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 307–08. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201, subdiv. 11(a) (2006) (requiring
that permanency hearings for children under the age of eight shall commence no
later than six months after placement).
136. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 308–09.
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137

preference for tribal court jurisdiction, the court concluded the
flexible nature of the “good cause” provision permitted state rules
to determine whether the proceedings had reached an advanced
138
stage.
As a result, the drawn-out nature of the case authorized
139
the court to find good cause existed to deny the transfer.
In contrast, the dissent, authored by Justice Page, questioned
the majority’s willingness to adopt a more liberal construction of
The majority, the dissent argued, espoused
“good cause.”
unwarranted confidence in the ability of state courts to effectuate
the goals of ICWA, while relying on assertions of substantial
140
compliance and progress without corresponding proof.
Justice Page observed that such progress has not been shown
in Minnesota, again emphasizing Minnesota’s significant historical
141
role in removal proceedings.
Absent solid quantitative proof of
advancement, Justice Page found that the “good cause” exception
should be interpreted narrowly. And as “the goals of the ICWA
appear to be unfulfilled and because, as the court notes, the goodcause exception . . . may operate as a mechanism for easy
142
circumvention of the ICWA,” the exception is inapplicable here.
IV. ANALYSIS
In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B. precariously skirts the edge of
presumptive tribal court jurisdiction in child protection
proceedings involving Indian children not residing within or
domiciled on reservations. By evaluating the transfer motion’s
143
timeliness according to a state-prescribed timeline, the Minnesota
Supreme Court risks infusing the proceedings with the very state144
law bias ICWA sought to avoid.

137. See id. at 304, 309 (“[W]e must defer to the experience, wisdom, and
compassion of the . . . tribal courts to fashion an appropriate remedy.”) (citing
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989) (quoting In re
Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986))).
138. See T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 305, 307–09.
139. See id. at 307–08.
140. Id. at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).
141. Id. See also supra note 5.
142. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).
143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1989) (“It is clear from the very text of the ICWA, not to
mention its legislative history . . . that Congress was concerned with the rights of
Indian families and Indian communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”).
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As pointed out by the dissent, the majority relied rather
significantly on an observation that most state courts have made
145
substantial progress effectuating ICWA.
Consider the following:
A January 1992 study in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
makes clear that greater attention to ICWA is necessary in
many areas in order to comply with federal law. In
particular, the study revealed that efforts to keep Indian
children with their families were minimal in forty-eight
percent of the cases examined. Also of concern is the
continued failure of the courts to follow ICWA placement
preferences once an initial custody determination is
made. Finally, the study noted that noncompliance with
laws respecting cultural heritage is more prevalent with
Indian child custody proceedings than with any other
146
ethnic group.
In 2005, a Minnesota Supreme Court study concluded “not
only that Native American children continue to be
disproportionately placed out of home, but also that the number of
147
Based on data
such out-of-home placements is increasing.”
148
collected during 2000 to 2004, the 2005 study speaks to an
ongoing reverberation of the troublesome bias of earlier decades.
Given Minnesota’s haunting past, such statistics should command
149
significant pause to the use of state law in ICWA cases.
145. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). Cf. Carriere, supra note
22, at 589–90. Carriere writes:
The publicly avowed purpose of the ICWA was to end forced
acculturation of Native American children into Euro-American society by
recognizing a predominantly tribal jurisdiction over tribal child welfare
cases. Close examination of the Act’s application in the area of
concurrent jurisdiction reveals the limits on the dominant culture’s
willingness to abandon its own representation of the subordinate culture
and its control over it.
Id.
146. Wahl, supra note 24, at 836–37.
147. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). See also Minnesota
Supreme Court, Minnesota’s Court Performance in Child Protection Cases: A
Reassessment Under the Federal Court Improvement Program 24 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter
Reassessment] (finding a general increase in out-of-home placement among
Indian children between 2000 and 2004).
148. Reassessment, supra note 147, at 24.
149. But cf. Atwood, supra note 23, at 655. Atwood suggests that
[r]ather than blaming state courts for the continuing high rate of
placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes and institutions,
reformers might look to the persistence of severe socioeconomic
problems on Indian reservations and among urban Indian populations.
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While X.T.B.’s placement proceeding appears free from
150
the present decision threatens a legal
outward state bias,
backslide into times of greater state encroachment by bolstering
the influence of state law in “good cause” determinations. Critics
assert that the “good cause” exception often equips state courts
151
with a convenient tool to circumvent ICWA mandates. The peril
in allowing state courts increasing deference regarding “good
cause” is a return to the dominance of ill-suited state laws in Indian
child welfare proceedings. The mechanisms designed to protect
against state abuse risk dilution through broad common-law
holdings regarding state law in ICWA proceedings, incipient steps
152
of which T.T.B. conceivably represents.
One of the ways to guard against state abuse is through a de
novo standard of review. An abuse of discretion standard,
153
overturning the trial court only on clear error, does not promote
the aims of ICWA in its purest form. Small encroachments by state
courts in making discretionary “good cause” determinations go
largely unnoticed in absence of obvious error, effectively removing
matters from the preferred jurisdiction of the tribal court.
Alternatively, the de novo standard allows the reviewing court
to approach the case anew in light of the applicable law and trial
154
record, enabling the greatest scrutiny of state court decisions.

The high incidence of poverty, crime, and substance abuse among Indian
communities can fundamentally undercut the goals of the ICWA . . . .
[B]irth parents may choose to place their children with non-Indian
families and may oppose transfer to tribal courts precisely because of the
socioeconomic conditions existing on many reservations . . . .
Id.
150. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 309 (“[T]here is nothing in the record to suggest
that resort to the good-cause exception was done for purposes of undermining
ICWA. . . . [T]he record reflects much effort on the part of the district court and
the county to comply with ICWA’s directives.”).
151. See Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion:
Eliminating the “Good Cause” Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements,
79 MINN. L. REV. 1167, 1193–95 (1995) (advocating abolishment of the “good
cause” exception for a “firm presumption [of tribal jurisdiction] . . . absent one of
several specific exceptions”); Carriere, supra note 22, at 648 (arguing the “good
cause” exception allows state courts to easily sidestep tribal jurisdiction).
152. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).
153. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (8th ed. 2004) (defining abuse of discretion
as “an appellate court’s standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be
grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.”).
154. Id. at 94 (defining de novo review as “an appeal in which the appellate
court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without
deference to the trial court's rulings”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 1
7. BUCHER - ADC

1450

6/11/2008 6:20:42 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

The Minnesota Supreme Court already endorsed de novo review
when evaluating the factors weighed by a trial court in construing
ICWA’s provisions, distinguishing these factors from those findings
155
of fact not overturned unless “clearly erroneous.”
Such careful
scrutiny comports with Congress’ original intent to rein in state
influence and is ever mindful of preventing future abuse in Indian
156
child welfare proceedings.
157
Although the court utilized the de novo standard in T.T.B.,
another step can be made toward hastening the directives Congress
158
set forth in ICWA’s prefatory findings.
To achieve the greatest
amount of protection, de novo review should be copiously applied
159
with a lens of interpretive narrowness, construing any inference
in favor of tribal court jurisdiction and against the state.
Like so many cases that find themselves the subject of law
review articles, T.T.B. offers an illustration of competing policy
arguments rather than a formulaic solution to a complex problem.
Here, the arguments of a timely resolution and spent resources in
the state system collided against the lengthy distance and inevitable
delay should the matter be transferred to the tribal court. Overtly,
the historical bias ICWA so fiercely guarded against was not
apparent. The decision was not clear-cut and the scales failed to
160
substantially favor a particular side. It was, no doubt, a hard case.
These are the situations in which ICWA’s remedial intent
should tip the scales in favor of tribal court jurisdiction. The
Minnesota 2007 Tribal/State Indian Child Welfare Agreement (the
Agreement) makes an important and well-heeded observation:
The [State of Minnesota and subscribing Tribes]
acknowledge that, as sovereigns, they may disagree as to
155. See In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 1994) (“We will
not reverse findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. ‘Considering improper
factors’ or ‘improperly weighing certain factors’ are issues of law . . . which we will
review de novo.”).
156. See infra note 184. Further emphasizing the importance of close scrutiny,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held evidentiary standards in ICWA proceedings
should be on par with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of criminal
matters, noting that “[t]he ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ burden of proof is a clear
and known standard; indeed, it is the highest burden of proof in our
jurisprudence and we should be able to apply it here.” In re Welfare of B.W., 454
N.W.2d 437, 445 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
157. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 307.
158. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
159. See T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).
160. See Metteer, supra note 88, at 472 (calling for reform “to insure that the
‘hard cases’ that have made bad law for nearly two decades do not continue”).
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the extent of each others’ authority, power, and
jurisdiction in [child welfare] proceedings. The parties
agree, however, that the fundamental purpose of the
federal and state laws . . . is to secure and to preserve an
Indian child’s sense of belonging to her or his family and
Band or Tribe. They agree that cooperating to combine
their abilities and resources to provide effective assistance
to Indian children and their families is the best means to
161
reach this shared goal.
The Agreement reflects Minnesota’s responsibilities under
both federal and state law to “protect an Indian child’s sense of
162
Further, carrying out these
belonging to family and tribe.”
responsibilities “require[s] collaboration with the tribes and the
use of the guidance, resources and participation of a child’s
163
Through the Agreement, the State of Minnesota and the
tribe.”
subscribing tribes expressed their intention “to strengthen
implementation of the letter, spirit and intent” of the statutory
164
provisions.
Thus, when an appellate court finds itself wedged between
state law and a jurisdictional transfer that comports with ICWA, the
de novo standard of review provides the greatest opportunity to
165
reconsider the matter in light of ICWA’s remedial intent.
And a
lens of interpretive narrowness gives proper acquiescence to the
166
Accompanied by a lens of
expertise of the tribal court.
interpretive
narrowness,
de
novo
review
strengthens
implementation of the letter, intent, and spirit of ICWA and
accords the necessary deference to the Act’s historical backdrop
while conscientiously promoting the preference for tribal court
jurisdiction.

161. MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 4.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 6 (“Minnesota case law has determined that a ‘transfer of
jurisdiction over Indian child custody matters to tribal authorities is mandated by
[ICWA] whenever possible.’”) (quoting In re Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 446
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990)).
166. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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V. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS: EVIDENCE OF APPLIED
INTERPRETIVE NARROWNESS?
Recent case law suggests a promising shift towards applying
interpretive narrowness to the “good cause” exception in Indian
child welfare proceedings. In July 2007, the matter of In re Welfare
167
came before the Minnesota Court of
of Children of R.M.B.
168
Appeals. The court utilized both the de novo standard of review
and, arguably, a lens of interpretive narrowness to find that good
cause did not exist to deny the tribe’s request to transfer
169
jurisdiction, despite the advanced nature of the proceedings.
The children involved in R.M.B. were placed in foster care in
170
October 2004 and were subsequently found to be in need of
protection or services, known as a CHIPS designation, in
171
November.
The tribe filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to
172
the tribal court in September 2006, slightly two years after the
173
CHIPS adjudication.
While the appellate court duly noted that

167. 735 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
168. Id. at 351 (citing In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 307
(Minn. 2006) (“But the application of ICWA to undisputed facts presents a
question of law, which we review de novo.”)).
169. Id. at 354.
170. Id. at 349.
171. Id. The “CHIPS” acronym denotes a “child in need of protection or
services.” See generally MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6 (2006) (describing the
circumstances in which a child may receive a CHIPS designation).
172. R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d at 350.
173. Evidence in the record suggests
that the tribe filed its petition in anticipation of the county filing a
permanent-placement petition. The timing of the petition to transfer
jurisdiction is consistent with ICWA’s purpose of maintaining an Indian
child’s cultural and tribal ties and promoting the “stability of Indian
tribes and families” . . . which may not have been implicated at an earlier
stage in the CHIPS proceeding.
Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
In fact, there was some confusion in the district court over whether a
CHIPS proceeding fell within the types of child welfare proceedings that ICWA
governed. The original district court order granting the tribe’s request to transfer
jurisdiction “includ[ed] a finding that the proceeding is not at an ‘advanced stage’
because it ‘continues to be a CHIPS case’ in that neither a petition to terminate
parental rights nor a petition for permanent placement is pending.” Id. at 350.
The appellate court subsequently ruled that “[w]hen the district court
concluded that a CHIPS proceeding was not at an advanced stage because neither
a [petition to terminate parental rights] nor a permanent-placement petition was
pending, it improperly conflated two proceedings that are distinct under ICWA.”
Id. at 352. Instead, the “proper inquiry [was] . . . whether the CHIPS proceeding
was at an advanced stage.” Id.
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“[t]he lapse of time between [the foster-care placement, the CHIPS
proceeding, and the tribe’s motion] makes evident the strength of
the argument that the CHIPS proceeding was at an advanced
174
stage,” it still chose to affirm the district court’s decision to
175
transfer jurisdiction.
The appellate court ruled that even if the lower court found
the CHIPS proceeding had reached an advanced stage, this was not
an absolute prohibition against the tribe’s request to transfer
176
jurisdiction.
“ICWA does not mandate, and the Guidelines do
not suggest, denial of a petition to transfer jurisdiction even when
177
The court emphasized the
good cause for denial exists.”
compulsory nature of “shall” in ICWA’s section 1911(b) transfer
178
provision, juxtaposing it against the permissive “may” present in
the Guidelines, as to whether the advanced nature of a proceeding
necessarily forced a finding of good cause and subsequent denial of
179
the transfer request.
In essence, the appellate court first used the de novo standard
of review to find the CHIPS proceeding properly within the scope
of ICWA and then applied a lens of interpretive narrowness. As a
result, the court held that the advanced nature of a proceeding,
despite qualifying as a “good cause” exception, did not expressly bar

Thus, confusion as to what type of proceedings fell within ICWA’s
coverage could easily explain the timing of the tribe’s petition to transfer
jurisdiction—late in terms of the on-going CHIPS proceeding, but timely in light
of the impending county action to terminate parental rights—a proceeding clearly
covered under ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000). Although the county filed a
petition for permanent placement following the request to transfer jurisdiction, it
was withdrawn at the November 30, 2006 hearing on the tribe’s petition. R.M.B.,
735 N.W.2d at 350.
174. R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d at 352 n.7.
175. Id. at 353.
176. Id.
177. Id. See also In re Welfare of Children of B.W., No. A07–612, 2007 WL
2417331, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007) (“Appellants’ argument focuses
exclusively on demonstrating that good cause to deny the transfer exists in this
case. But appellants’ premise is flawed . . . . [ICWA] does not mandate . . . denial
of a petition to transfer even when good cause for denial exists.”).
178. R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d at 353 (“Specifically, ICWA provides that, ‘in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, [the district court] shall transfer . . .
jurisdiction [to] the tribe.’”) (modification in original).
179. Id. (“Similarly, the BIA guidelines provide that ‘[g]ood cause not to
transfer the proceeding may exist if . . . [t]he proceeding was at an advanced stage
when the petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the
petition promptly after receiving notice of the hearing.’”) (modification in
original).
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a transfer to tribal court under the Act; therefore, the matter
should be transferred.
Finally, the court also reiterated “that ‘ICWA and Minnesota
law recognize concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction allowing
the child’s tribe to intervene “at any point” in the state court
180
proceedings.’”
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the advanced nature of the
CHIPS proceeding sufficiently placed the matter within one of
ICWA’s “good cause” exceptions, the court’s willingness to narrowly
construe the statute and interpretive Guidelines properly
effectuated the congressionally-espoused preference for tribal
court jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
ICWA is a remedial statute. Through its enactment, Congress
sought to assuage the cultural erosion and abuse of native tribes
through state systems that were fundamentally incongruent with
181
and ignorant of social workings within Indian tribes.
The procedural mechanisms of presumptive tribal court
jurisdiction and intervention recognize a tribe’s critical interest in
182
As In re Welfare of Children of R.M.B.
the welfare of its children.
demonstrates, methods of construction can help avoid the risk of
inappropriate “good cause” determinations and facilitate
resolution of the hard cases like In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B.
Pairing the de novo standard of review with a lens of interpretive
narrowness effectively advances the aims of ICWA by critically
reviewing the application of state law and further championing the
180. Id. at 353–54 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Welfare of Child of
T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Minn. 2006)). Of note, the appellate court pointed
out that tribal values may play a role in the timing of a petition to transfer
jurisdiction:
[A]lthough good cause to deny a transfer petition may exist if the
“petition is inexcusably filed when the proceeding is already at an
advanced stage,” a district court must recognize that “fundamental tribal
values may guide the timing by a tribe to petition for a transfer” of
jurisdiction to the tribal court.
Id. at 354 (quoting MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 6–7).
181. See ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000); see also Atwood, supra note 23, at
654 (“The central role of the federal and state governments in the decimation of
Indian tribes and Indian families is an undisputed historical fact, and the
continued impact of the policies of termination is starkly evident in the grave
socioeconomic problems facing many Indian populations today.”).
182. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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overwhelmingly accepted idea that tribal courts are most often the
183
best forum for Indian child welfare proceedings.

183. See In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Minn. 2006); see
also In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting The
Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,591, 67,584–85 (1979) (“The ICWA is to be ‘liberally construed in favor of a
result that is consistent’ with ‘deferring to tribal judgment’ and furthering
Congressional purposes in passing the statute.”)); In re Welfare of B.W., 454
N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“[I]t is essential to the purposes of the
ICWA to allow appropriate tribal authorities to determine these matters according
to tribal law, customs and mores best known to them. Since . . . state social service
agencies and state courts are part of the problem, transfer of jurisdiction . . . is
mandated by the ICWA whenever possible.”).
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